The paper studies wage and employment determination in the Swedish business sector from the mid-1910s to the late 1930s. This period includes the boom and bust cycle of the early 1920s as well as the Great Depression of the early 1930s. The events of the early 1920s are particularly intriguing, involving inflation running at an annual rate of 30 percent followed by a period of sharp deflation where nominal wages and prices fell by 30 percent and unemployment increased from 5 to 30 percent. We examine whether relatively standard wage and employment equations can account for the volatile economic development during the interwar years. By and large, the answer is a qualified yes. Industry wages were responsive to industry-specific firm performance, suggesting a significant role for "insider forces" in wage determination. Unemployment had a strong downward impact on wages. There is evidence that reductions in working time added to wage pressure; yet estimates of labor demand equations suggest that cuts in working time may have slightly increased employment as firms substituted workers for hours.
Introduction
The Great Depression has been the subject of an extensive research literature. Most of this literature has been concerned with the US experience and focused on the impact of aggregate demand, in particular the role of fiscal and monetary policies. A smaller literature has studied the impact of aggregate supply factors, such as the role of labor market imperfections and labor market policies. There is considerable consensus that shocks to aggregate demand were the main drivers of the slump in the 1930s, although some studies argue that supply side factors can account for a large part of the depression. 1 When studying the experiences of the Great Depression, it is worthwhile to extend the perspective to include the events of the 1920s. This is relevant for several countries, including the UK and the US, which both experienced recessions in the early 1920s. It is particularly relevant for Sweden, where the boom and bust cycle in the early 1920s brought the economy from high inflation to sharp deflation with wages and prices falling at annual rates of 30 percent. The deflation was associated with an increase in unemployment from 5 percent to 30 percent. It is notable that unemployment during the 1930s peaked at 25 percent, thus never reaching the levels experienced in the early 1920s. Compared to other countries, the Swedish depression in the early 1920s was exceptionally deep as the shocks from the international economy were reinforced by contractionary domestic policies.
The Swedish literature on the depressions of the early 1920s and the early 1930s has mainly dealt with aggregate demand issues, including the role of exchange rate policies. Studies of how the Swedish labor market fared are rare and econometric work on the two depressions in general is hard to come by. 2 This paper contributes to the literature on interwar labor markets by providing quantitative evidence on how wages and employment were determined in interwar Sweden. By doing so, the paper also offers perspectives on several strands of literature on wage determination and collective bargaining. This research includes numerous 1 See e.g. Brunner (1981) and Eichengreen and Hatton (1988) for contributions to research on the Great Depression and interwar labor markets. Dimsdale et al. (1989) present a study of the interwar labor market in the UK and Hatton and Thomas (2010) offer a comparative perspective on US and UK interwar labor markets. 2 Discussions and analyses of Swedish economic policies during the interwar period are contained in e.g. Bergström (1969) , Jonung (1979 Jonung ( , 1981 , Lundberg (1983 Lundberg ( /1994 and Östlind (1945) . Fregert (1994) includes detailed studies of wage contracts and business cycles; see also Fregert (2000) and Jonung (2004, 2008) . Wadensjö (1978, 1979 ) present estimates of Phillips curves that include interwar data. Hassler et al. (1994) provide a quantitative description of stylized Swedish business cycle facts using data from the 1860s and onwards.
studies of how labor market institutions and policies shape real wage outcomes as well as research on nominal wage flexibility (or the lack thereof).
One purpose of the paper is to examine the role of insider forces in wage determination. To what extent does firms' ability to pay impact on wages? There is a presumption that higher productivity or higher output prices would translate into higher wages under decentralized wage bargaining with strong labor unions. 3 Wage bargaining in interwar Sweden took place at a relatively decentralized industry level, thus suggesting that one should expect to find significant insider effects.
We also wish to shed light on how certain labor market policies affected wage outcomes. The first policy concerns working time legislation. There are numerous "modern" papers, theoretical as well as empirical, that investigate how shorter working time affects wage and employment outcomes. 4 Sweden saw sharp reductions in the "standard" workweek during the 1910s, culminating in legislation on a 48-hour workweek (eight-hour work day) from 1920.
The labor unions demanded "full compensation" for the loss in earnings and a period of widespread industrial conflicts followed. Thus, a goal of the paper is to provide estimates of how the cuts in working time affected wages and employment. More generally, we will study how firms in booms and slumps adjusted labor input along the extensive and intensive margins, i.e., workers and hours per worker. It turns out that adjustment along the intensive margin accounted for most of the variance in total hours during the interwar period.
A final purpose of the paper is to investigate whether public employment programs targeted at the unemployed caused an increase in wage pressure, thereby crowding out some "regular" employment. Such programs were introduced in Sweden on a small scale in the 1910s and reached a non-trivial scale during the early 1930s. Similar programs were also introduced in the US as part of the New Deal. The impact of such programs has been subject to debate and research, in the past as well as more recently. The empirical literature on these issues includes, among others, contributions from Bårdsen et al. (2010) , Forslund (1994) , Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) , Johansen (1996 Johansen ( , 1999 and Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) . 4 An example of a relatively recent theoretical paper is Marimon and Zilibotti (2000) . An empirical study of recent Swedish experiences of working time reductions is contained in Nordström Skans (2004) . 5 See Calmfors and Forslund (1991) and Forslund and Kolm (2004) for studies that use Swedish data from the post-World War II period. Darby (1976) and Kesselman and Savin (1978) discuss the New Deal experiences.
A recent paper partly related to the present study is Bårdsen et al. (2010) conventional bargaining models and with empirical results obtained in studies that make use of data from recent decades. For example, there is evidence of a long-run "wage curve" that relates real wages to labor productivity and with negative unemployment elasticity. The present study makes use of fewer industries than Bårdsen et al. but extends the data series back to the World War I period, thus including the turbulent years of the early 1920s. Our paper also differs from Bårdsen et al. by examining the impact on wages of temporary public works and cuts in working time and by studying labor demand on the extensive and intensive margins.
The next section of the paper provides a brief overview of the macroeconomic setting and describes key labor market characteristics of the interwar period, including institutions and market outcomes. Section 3 includes specification and estimation of wage equations, both at the aggregate level and the sectoral level. Section 4 deals with labor demand at the extensive and intensive margins and Section 5 concludes.
Labor Markets in Interwar Sweden

The Macroeconomic Setting
The Swedish interwar years featured two major slumps in economic activity. The first depression that took place in the early 1920s was deeper but shorter than the slump that occurred a decade later. Both depressions involved sharp declines in output and employment and huge increases in unemployment. GDP fell by 8 percent between 1920 and 1921 and manufacturing output fell by over 20 percent over the same period. The unemployment rate jumped from 4.5 percent in the beginning of 1920 to 30 percent in early 1922. The recovery in terms of output was remarkably quick: GDP increased by almost 10 percent between 1921 and 1922 and manufacturing output increased by over 20 percent. The labor market recovered only gradually, however; unemployment remained at two-digit levels for the rest of the decade. 6 With some abuse of language, we frequently refer to the period from the mid-1910s to the late 1930s as the "interwar" period.
The slump of the early 1930s was milder than in the early 1920s but lasted longer.
Manufacturing output declined by some 6-7 percent for three consecutive years and unemployment increased from 9.5 to 25 percent between early 1930 and early1933. The rebound in output kicked in during 1933 and 1934; manufacturing output increased by 10 percent in 1932-33 and by over 20 percent in 1933-34. Unemployment, however, remained at two-digit levels for most of the decade.
A striking difference between the two slumps, aside from depth and duration, concerns the evolution of nominal wages and prices. Deflation was sharp in the early 1920s with wages and producer prices falling by almost 30 percent at the trough. Deflation, by comparison, was mild in the early 1930s; wages and prices declined by at most a couple of percentage points. reinforced by domestic policies. Indeed, the Swedish crisis of the early 1920s seems to have been deeper than elsewhere. One contributing factor was the desire among most politicians (and economists as well) to pursue a monetary policy that would restore the Swedish krona to the gold parity it had before World War I.
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Sweden had left the gold standard in 1914 and the krona had depreciated against gold in subsequent years. A reversal of this trend required restrictive monetary policy and this was also undertaken by the Riksbank; the short-term interest rate set by the Riksbank reached 7.5 percent in the early 1920s, higher than previously experienced. The restrictive monetary policy succeeded in its goal: gold parity was restored by the end of 1922 and the gold standard was formally adopted in 1924. But the successful restoration of the gold standard had a price in terms of a deeper depression than would otherwise have been experienced. The length of new collective agreements hovered between one and two years in the 1920s and the 1930s. Most agreements could be renegotiated in a given year (Fregert, 2000) .
Employer associations were created mainly as a response to the growth of labor unions. The Bergström (1969) includes an analysis of Swedish fiscal policy in the interwar period. 11 See Kjellberg (1983, pp. 269-70) for data on union density and Fregert and Jonung (2008) for data on coverage rates. some 60-70 percent of workers in the textile industry were employed in firms that were members of SAF by the late 1930s.
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Labor market conflicts (strikes and lockouts) were relatively frequent in the 1920s; see Figure   1 . Some 6-7 percent of employees were involved in conflicts during 1920 as well as during 1925. Conflict intensity during the 1930s was considerably lower, presumably influenced by new legislation on collective agreements in 1929. An important ingredient of this legislation was its stipulation of a "peace obligation" once a contract was agreed upon. The right to undertake industrial action, such as a strike or a lockout, was thereby restricted to periods when contracts had expired. See SOU 1936 :32, Öhman (1970 or Axelsson et al. (1987) for descriptions and discussions of Swedish unemployment policies during the interwar period. 14 We will use "relief works" as a generic term for public employment programs during the interwar period.
in the form of (cash) unemployment assistance. Figure 2 shows the number of relief workers relative to the total number of employees. Participation in these programs accounted for slightly more than one percent of the number of employees in 1922 and reached two percent in 1933.
The compensation available for relief workers was, at least during the 1920s, significantly lower than wages obtained by regular employees. Such a wage differential was deemed desirable so as to provide incentives for active search for regular jobs. This view was challenged in the early 1930s when a Social Democratic government came into power and Keynesian policies were increasingly advocated. Relief works were then viewed as instruments for expansionary policies and the "wage penalty" for relief workers was eradicated.
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There is some, although limited, information on public cash unemployment assistance in the interwar period. The number of workers receiving unemployment assistance was typically lower than the number of relief workers, at least for the period 1922-32. The level of cash assistance per day amounted to roughly 50 percent of the daily remuneration to a relief worker.
Summing up, public unemployment insurance was virtually nonexistent for most of the interwar period. Cash unemployment assistance was available for workers who were members of unions that offered UI. Active measures in the form public relief works were substantially expanded in the early 1920s and, in particular, in the early 1930s. 
Hours of Work
The length of the workweek was basically unregulated in the 19 th century. A number of collective agreements during the 1910s brought about substantial reductions in the Swedish workweek and established a "standard" workweek. These negotiated working time reductions were followed by legislation on the 48-hour workweek (eight-hour workday) that came into force in 1920.
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The introduction of the 48-hour workweek had strong repercussions on wage bargaining and triggered major industrial conflicts. Indeed, more workdays were lost in conflicts in 1920 than in any other year during the interwar period ( Figure 1 ). The employers and their organizations had struggled fiercely against the legislation. Their resistance to the reform was not softened when it turned out that the labor unions demanded "full compensation" for the cut in hours,
i.e., wage increases so as to avoid income reductions. Failure to reach collective agreements on this matter initiated strikes in early 1920 in the metal industry -strikes that triggered largescale lockouts from the employers. The agreements that were finally agreed upon seem to have delivered substantial compensation, at least for metal workers; the agreements stipulated wage increases by 8 percent for workers with time-rate pay whose workweek was reduced from 52 to 48 hours.
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Employers could also count on some gains in terms of increased flexibility and more efficient use of working time. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the standard workweek along with average annual hours per worker in the business sector.
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The shortening of the standard workweek is associated with a marked decline in actual hours worked. There is also a strong procyclical pattern in actual 
Wages, Prices and Unemployment
Wages and Prices
The evolution of real consumption and real product wages for the business sector are displayed in Figure 5 . The former wage is defined as the hourly wage divided by the consumer price, the latter as the hourly wage divided by the value added price for the business sector. Taxes are thus ignored, but they are unimportant for the period under study. Over the years 1913-39, the trend increase in the real consumption wage amounted to 2.9 percent per year whereas the real product wage increased at a rate of 2.8 percent. see Table 1 . How could the dramatic nominal wage cuts of the early 1920s occur? The severity of the slump with sharply falling output demand was employers' overriding argument for wage cuts.
The fact that consumer prices had been falling should also have weakened workers' resistance to nominal wage cuts.
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In some cases, collective agreements had expired or had been abrogated, so that the employers could unilaterally set wages at their own discretion. This was the case in the metal industry during 1921-22. The overall coverage of collective agreements declined by some 15 percentage points between 1920 and 1922; in the metal industry, coverage fell from 70 to 12 percent. In other cases, nominal wage cuts were agreed upon through collective bargaining, sometimes after strikes and/or mediation by governmentappointed arbitrators. These agreements were often preceded by vastly incompatible employer offers and union demands. An example is the textile industry where employers initially asked for 20-30 percent wage cuts in 1921, a proposal to which the union responded by demanding wage increases of 10-15 percent. The final agreement that was reached after strikes and lockouts was largely in line with the employers' initial requests.
24 23 In a speech 1918, Knut Wicksell argued strongly against the idea that workers would be unwilling to accept wage cuts when prices were falling; cited by Lundberg (1983 Lundberg ( /1994 
Unemployment and Matching
Available information on unemployment during the interwar period pertains to joblessness among union members. This series is displayed in Figure 7 Available data from the PES on the annual flows of vacancies, job applicants and job placements can be used to examine labor market matching. Table 2 
Wage Determination
Wage Bargaining
We now turn to an empirical analysis of wage determination in interwar Sweden. The most widely used approach to studies of wage determination invokes the Nash solution, which
gives the wage as the outcome of bilateral bargaining between a union and a firm. The bargained wage generally depends on factors that influence the firm's profits and union members' welfare. The specific predictions differ across models and are sensitive to assumptions concerning, inter alia, the bargaining setup, product market conditions and the technology of firms.
In some popular models with isoelastic (Cobb-Douglas) technology, the bargained wage is obtained as a markup on unemployment benefits -or, more generally, a markup on expected outside income opportunities -with no direct role for variables influencing the firm's ability to pay, such as output prices and productivity. However, the idea that a firm's ability to pay influences bargaining outcomes has considerable intuitive appeal and is also supported by the empirical literature. A role for ability to pay can be motivated in several ways. It is, for example, straightforward to show that a departure from isoelastic (i.e., Cobb-Douglas) technology makes a difference. The bargained wage increases as a response to a higher output price if the elasticity of labor demand with respect to the wage falls when the output price increases. This outcome obtains when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is less than one.
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A slightly more complex model is due to Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) , similar in spirit to the insider-outsider models developed by Lindbeck and Snower (1990) . This model maintains the assumption that technology is isoelastic, but posits that nominal wages are set under uncertainty about output prices. The profit-maximizing firm determines employment as a function of the bargained wage and the realized output price. The union cares about the wage, but also about the risk that a representative member will be laid off: the higher the bargained wage, the higher the layoff risk. The bargained wage pertaining to firm (or sector) i can be written as a convex combination of insider factors (the firm's ability to pay) and outsider factors; the latter include the unemployment rate capturing job chances outside the firm as well as wages elsewhere and unemployment benefits. A log-linear version of the resulting nominal wage equation can be written as:
(1)
or equivalently as a real wage equation of the form:
where w is the nominal wage, q a measure of labor productivity, p the output price and w the outside wage, all in logs. The log of the unemployment rate is denoted u while z represents other variables that conceivably affect wage outcomes. The "insider weight" is captured by the parameter  ,
Eq. (1) is a micro wage equation that takes outside wages as given.
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It readily translates into an aggregate wage equation under the assumption of a symmetric equilibrium, i.e., i w w w   :
We use eq. (1) as the basis for empirical wage equations at the industry level, whereas eq. (3) serves as the basis for aggregate wage equations. The empirical wage equations allow for dynamics that are absent from (1), (2) and (3). The precise specification of the dynamics is largely determined by the data.
Empirical Wage Equations: The Aggregate Level
A dynamic version of eq. (3) is given by eq. (4) below. The log of the consumer price is denoted pc and the log of the length of the standard workweek is denoted s h . Subscript t denotes time and  is a stochastic error. Richer dynamics are conceivable but do not seem to be required by the data. The specification excludes any impact of the level of the wedge 27 In their estimations of industry wage equations on Norwegian data, Bårdsen et al. (2010) 
This general specification nests several special cases. Nominal neutrality is ensured if 
The slope (elasticity) of the long run wage curve is thus given as
Inclusion of the standard workweek is perhaps problematic since some of the variation in this variable is driven by collective bargaining, thus possibly endogenous. It can be argued, however, that working time decisions are predetermined relative to wages since they are taken much less frequently and therefore reflect more long-run considerations. As noted above, the labor unions explicitly demanded wage compensation in order to avoid income reductions when the 48-hour workweek was introduced through legislation. It has been a common presumption in the literature on the interwar period that the unions attempted to achieve wage compensation for the cut in hours -and probably succeeded in doing so.     in terms of eq. (4); the restriction is not statistically rejected.
Empirical Results
The sum of the coefficients on the price inflation terms are above unity, but a formal test does not reject the conventional price homogeneity hypothesis; the t-value for the restriction is 1.56
for the model in the first column. Comparisons of estimates with and without price homogeneity restrictions do not indicate that the restrictions matter much for the "other"
estimates. Unemployment has a downward impact on wages; the mean of the estimates is -0.08, implying that a rise in the unemployment rate by 10 percent, e.g. from 10 to 11 percent, would reduce wage inflation the following year by almost one percentage point.
The lagged wage share consistently enters with negative coefficients that hover around -0. Working time (the standard workweek) enters with highly significant and negative coefficients. This confirms anecdotal evidence and common claims that the introduction of the eight-hour workday in 1920 did result in an increase in wage pressure as the labor unions attempted to prevent a decline in earnings associated with shorter working time. The magnitude of the impact seems implausibly large but it turns out that the estimated impact of the standard workweek is quite sensitive to the sample period. Table 3 .
The Impact of Public Works
The expansion of temporary public jobs to combat unemployment began in the 1910s and reached non-negligible magnitudes in the early 1930s (see Figure 1 above). This development is clearly partly endogenous to the evolution of overall labor market conditions but presumably also reflects some shifts of policy preferences. It is difficult, however, to think of credible instruments for relief jobs. Table 5 shows results from some OLS regressions based on aggregate data where relief jobs as a fraction of total employment, R, is included in four different ways (lagged or not lagged, logged or not logged). There is a presumption that the use of lagged variables should be less prone to simultaneity bias, but the estimates do not indicate substantial differences depending on the lag specifications. The R-variables are always associated with positive coefficients but are never statistically significant. Taken at face values, the estimates in the first two columns suggest that an increase in the fraction employed in relief works by one percentage point would be associated with a rise in wage growth by around 2 percentage points. We also note that the inclusion of relief jobs leads to relatively large increases (in absolute values) in the estimated unemployment parameters. This is not surprising considering the fact that unemployment and relief jobs exhibit a strong positive correlation (R=0.62). All in all, there is a consistent pattern that suggests that relief jobs have added to wage pressure although the magnitude of this effect is difficult to establish with much confidence. Summing up, the results from the empirical analysis suggest that wage behavior in the interwar period can be accounted for by a basically standard model of wage determination.
The results are consistent with the notion of a wage curve, i.e., a long-run relationship between real wages and unemployment, with sizeable unemployment elasticity. The results are consistent with nominal neutrality in the sense that real wages are independent of inflation in the long run. The shortening of the workweek appears to have triggered a substantial increase in wage pressure.
Empirical Wage Equations: The Sectoral Level
Our analysis of sectoral wage behavior makes use of data for nine industries that essentially comprise mining and manufacturing.
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Eq. (2) serves as the basis for the estimations. A general specification that nests (2) as a special case is: 
where i v is an industry-specific fixed effect and it  is a stochastic error term. We expect The unemployment rate is also the aggregate rate. Even with access to sector-specific data on unemployment there is a case for focusing on the aggregate rate since there is some intersectoral mobility of labor.
Two plausible restrictions are of interest. First, price homogeneity holds if 1 2 3 1       . By imposing this restriction on (6) one obtains a real wage equation of the form: 
Second, note that the long-run sectoral real wage level is linearly homogeneous in sectoral productivity and the outside real wage provided that the restriction 5 6 7 0
This is a theoretically sound restriction implied by a standard bargaining model. Eq. (7) then translates into:
The terms associated with the parameters 5  and 6
 can be thought of as capturing error corrections. Wage inflation in the current period is lower, the higher the lagged real wage is relative to firms' ability to pay (productivity); it is also lower the higher the lagged wage is relative to the outside wage (assuming 5 0   and 6 0   ).
Assuming i p pc    and i i i w p q      , the steady-state wage curve takes the form:
The "insider weight" pertaining to the long-run wage curve is obtained as
There is a presumption that the insider weight goes to zero in a competitive labor market but also in an economy where collective wage bargaining is completely centralized, thereby effectively eliminating bargaining power at the sectoral level.
Empirical Results
The estimation results are set out in Table 6 . We focus here on daily wages since these are available for almost all interwar years on the sectoral level (see Appendix 2). The equations are estimated by seeming unrelated regression (SUR). The contemporary correlations between the errors of equations estimated by OLS are high, typically ranging from 0.5 to 0.8. With such high correlations, estimation by SUR is much more efficient than OLS if the number of time periods, T, is at least double the number of cross-section units, N (see Beck and Katz, 1995) . We have T=26 and N=9 so the efficiency case for SUR is clear. The first three regressions in Table 5 correspond to eqs. (6), (7), and (8). The last column includes estimates where the aggregate variables (unemployment, the consumer price and standard hours) are replaced by time dummies. (Holmlund and Zetterberg, 1991; Forslund, 1994) . This is as should be expected given that wage bargaining was much less centralized during the interwar years, thus giving more scope for sector-specific factors.
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The slope (elasticity) of the wage curve implied by the estimates in the third column is around -0.2, holding the outside wage constant. The estimated impact of the standard workweek is again on the high side.
The Demand for Workers and Hours
As noted above, actual hours per worker were procyclical and accounted for more than half of the variance in total hours over the interwar period. This observation naturally leads to the conjecture that short-run fluctuations in hours per worker were largely driven by employers' decisions. We specify and estimate simple models capturing firms' demand for labor input along the extensive and intensive margins, i.e., the number of workers and hours per worker.
One can think of workers and hours per worker as two interrelated labor inputs along the lines analyzed by Nadiri and Rosen (1969) and others. We treat the standard workweek as exogenous in this exercise, assuming that the standard workweek -determined by legislation and collective agreements -puts a restriction on firms' input decisions.
Appendix 1 outlines a simple model of labor demand that delivers a framework for the empirical analysis. Consider a firm that operates in a perfectly competitive product market and takes the hourly wage as given. The production function specifies output as a function of workers and hours per worker. The production function is increasing and strictly concave in each argument. Production involves three kinds of labor costs. The first type is direct labor costs; in addition, there are costs of adjusting the workforce, such as costs for hiring and training workers; finally, there are costs to the firm of deviating from standard hours. Costs associated with hours exceeding standard hours include overtime premiums but also costs of deviating from the social norm embedded in standard hours. The firm's objective is to maximize the discounted flow of profits over an infinite time horizon. The firm controls the evolution of employment by its hiring decisions. The firm also determines work hours at every instant. One implication of this model is that work hours respond quickly to changes in e.g. real wage costs whereas the number of workers exhibits gradual adjustment. In fact, the short-run impact on hours is stronger than the long-run impact.
Models of Labor Demand
The estimated models are specified as follows:
Employment (in logs, n) is explained by the real product wage (in logs, w-p), the standard workweek (in logs can be rationalized in several ways. One possibility is that firms' markups of prices on wages vary over the business cycle. Another possibility is that some firms may be sales constrained and the fraction of constrained firms is most probably higher in slumps than in booms.
The equation for hours per worker (in logs h ) has an analogous structure. Lagged hours capture lagged adjustment of hours analogous to lagged adjustment of workers in eq. (8).
However, it turns out empirically that 6 0   cannot be rejected (t=0.43), so we end up with equations for workers and hours that include the same right-hand-side variables. The long-run elasticity of workers with respect to the real product wage is obtained as  reflects an idea of "dynamic substitutability": the greater the number of workers around, the less the need to make use of hours. These hypotheses thus imply that the long-run response of hours per worker to the real product wage should be numerically smaller than the short-run response. Firms adjust employment gradually as a result of hiring costs and make use of variations in hours as the main adjustment channel in the short run. The long-run response of hours to standard hours should be numerically larger than the short-run response, since a cut in standard hours increases the demand for workers (as firms substitute workers for hours), which in turn reduces hours per worker.
Estimation Results
The estimation results are set out in Table 7 . The number of workers is measured as the number of employees in the business sector. We note that the demand for hours exhibits much stronger short-run responsiveness to wages than the demand for workers does. The long-run wage elasticity, however, is numerically smaller for hours than for workers. The estimated long-run elasticity of hours with respect to standard hours is close to unity. An increase in standard hours has a sizeable negative impact on the demand for workers; the estimated longrun elasticity is -0.45. All else equal, an exogenous cut in working time by 10 percent would thus increase employment by 4.5 percent. Note also that lagged employment enters with highly significant and numerically sizeable magnitudes in both equations.
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The positive sign for lagged employment in the equation for workers reflects lagged adjustment, whereas the negative sign in the equation for hours captures dynamic substitutability between hours and workers. The immediate impact of the business cycle indicator AD is larger for hours than for workers. All in all, the estimates suggest that hours exhibit stronger short-run responsiveness to demand or wage shocks than workers do. This is in line with the empirical literature on labor demand.
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The estimated models perform well in dynamic (deterministic) simulations.
The mean absolute prediction error is 1.6 percent for workers and 1.8 percent for hours. We noted that an exogenous cut in working time would seem to increase employment, all else equal. But all is not equal, of course. In particular, there is a case for allowing for wage adjustment to cuts in hours. The long-run elasticity of employment with respect to standard hours with wage adjustment takes the form:
31 Hamermesh (1993) summarizes empirical studies of the demand for workers and hours as follows (p 269): "The overwhelming bulk of evidence … suggests strongly that employers adjust their demand for hours more rapidly than their demand for workers. …It is reasonable to assume that the cost of hiring and training new workers increases more rapidly than that of increasing the hours of current employees. When demand drops, the fear of losing trained employees raises the costs of layoffs relative to those of cutting hours." employment over this period. A robust finding is that unemployment exercised a strong downward pressure on wages. The estimates lend support to the concept of a wage curve, i.e., a relationship between unemployment and the real wage. Industry wages responded to the evolution of productivity in the industry. Reductions in working time appear to have added to wage pressure but our estimates do not suggest any adverse impact on employment since shorter working time induced firms to substitute workers for hours. Needless to say, these calculations should be treated with at least the usual caution. The elasticities that determine the impact on employment are not estimated with a degree of precision that warrants very strong conclusions.
Labor input adjustment along the intensive margin played an important role during the interwar period. In fact, fluctuations in hours per worker accounted for most of the variation in total hours. This contrasts sharply with labor input adjustment in recent decades where adjustments along the extensive margin have become much more important.
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One interpretation of these differences between now and then is that the costs to employers of where q is the exogenously given quit rate.
The firm's objective is to maximize the discounted flow of profits over an infinite time horizon, i.e., 
